A fundamental problem with the Nash equilibrium concept is the existence of certain "structurally deficient" equilibria that (i) lack fundamental robustness properties, and (ii) are difficult to analyze. The notion of a "regular" Nash equilibrium was introduced by Harsanyi. Such equilibria are highly robust and relatively simple to analyze. A game is said to be regular if all equilibria in the game are regular. In this paper it is shown that almost all potential games are regular. That is, except for a closed subset of potential games with Lebesgue measure zero, all potential games are regular. As an immediate consequence of this, the paper also proves an oddness result for potential games: In almost all potential games, the number of Nash equilibrium strategies is finite and odd.
1. Introduction. While the notion of Nash equilibrium is a universally accepted solution concept for games, several shortcomings have been noted over the years. A principal criticism (in addition to non-uniqueness) is that some Nash equilibrium strategies may be undesirable or unreasonable due to a lack of basic robustness properties. As a consequence, many equilibrium refinement concepts have been proposed [13, 16, 22, 24, 26, 33, 34] , each attempting to single out subsets of Nash equilibrium strategies that satisfy some desirable criteria.
One of the most stringent refinement concepts, originally proposed by Harsanyi [13] , is that a NE strategy be "regular". In the words of van Damme [33] , "regular Nash equilibria possess all the robustness properties that one can reasonably expect equilibria to posses." Such equilibria are quasi-strict [13, 33] , perfect [26] , proper [22] , strongly stable [16] , essential [34] , and isolated [33] . 1 If all equilibria of a game are regular, then the number of NE strategies in the game has been shown to be finite and, curiously, odd [13, 35] . Regular equilibria have also been studied in the context of games of incomplete information, where, as part of Harsanyi's celebrated purification theorem [10, 12] , they have been shown to be approachable.
A game is said to be regular if all equilibria in the game are regular. Harsanyi [13] showed that almost all 2 games are regular, and hence, in almost all games, all equilibria possess all the robustness properties we might reasonably hope for.
While this result is powerful when targeted at general N-player games, there are many important classes of games that have Lebesgue measure zero within the space of all games [1] . Harsanyi's result tells us nothing about equilibrium properties within such special classes of games. This is the case, for example, in the important class of multi-agent games known as potential games [21] .
A game is said to be a potential game if there exists some underlying function (generally referred to as the potential function) that all players implicitly seek to optimize. Potential games have many applications in economics and engineering [20, 21] , and are particularly useful in the study of multi-agent systems, e.g., [4, 6, 9, 17-19, 23, 25, 27, 36, 37] .
Considered within the space of all games, the set of potential games constitutes a low-dimensional subspace which has Lebesgue measure zero. Harsayi's regularity result provides no information on the abundance (or dearth) of regular equilibria within this class of games. Hence, when restricting attention to potential games, as is often done in the study of multi-agent systems, we are deprived of any generic results on the regularity, robustness, or finiteness of the equilibrium set. The main result of this paper is the following theorem.
Theorem 1. Almost all potential games are regular. We note that this implies that in almost all potential games, all equilibria are quasistrict, perfect, proper, strongly stable, essential, and isolated. Using Harsayi's oddness theorem (see [13] , Theorem 1), we see that in any regular potential game, the number of NE strategies is finite and odd. Hence, the following result is an immediate consequence of Theorem 1.
Theorem 2. In almost all potential games, the number of NE strategies is finite and odd.
Regularity may be seen as serving two purposes. First, it ensures that the equilibrium set possesses the desirable structural properties noted above (i.e., equilibria are isolated, robust, and finite in number). Second, it simplifies the analysis of the game near equilibrium points-the important features of players' utility functions near an equilibrium can be understood by looking only at first and second-order terms in the associated Taylor series expansion. In this sense, the role of regular equilibria in games is analogous to the role that non-degenerate critical points play in the study of real valued functions. 3 This amenable analytic structure can greatly facilitate the study of (for example) game-theoretic learning processes [30] or approachability in games with incomplete information [10] .
Our primary motivation for studying regular equilibria in potential games, as discussed above, is to characterize the fundamental regularity, robustness, and finiteness properties of the equilibrium set in potential games. Our secondary motivation comes from the perspective of learning theory. Fictitious play (FP) learning dynamics [2] may be seen as the natural learning dynamics associated with the NE concept. FP is known to converge to the set of NE in a variety of games, including potential games. However, the convergence result for FP in potential games is less than satisfying: FP may converge to a mixed-strategy (saddle point) NE, solutions of FP may be nonunique, and convergence rate estimates for FP can be impossible to establish [11] . In a companion paper [30] we show that these difficulties can be overcome by restricting attention to regular potential games. In particular, it is shown that in any regular potential game, (continuous-time) FP converges generically to a pure-strategy NE, solutions of FP are generically unique, and the rate of convergence of FP is generically exponential. 4 Combined with the result of this paper, this allows us to show that the FP learning dynamics are "well behaved" in almost all potential games. 3 A critical point x * of a function f : R n → R is said to be non-degenerate if the Hessian of f at x * is non-singular. When a critical point is non-degenerate, one can understand the important local properties of f using only the gradient and Hessian of f . If a critical point is degenerate then heavy algebraic machinery may be required to understand the local properties of f . With regard to games, if x * is an interior equilibrium point of a potential game with potential function U , then x * is regular if and only if x * is a non-degenerate critical point of x * . For non-interior equilibrium points the story is more involved, but the main idea is the same. 4 See [28] , [29] for a discussion of the rate of convergence of FP in regular potential games.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 1.1 we outline our strategy for proving Theorem 1. Section 2 sets up notation. Section 3 defines the notion of a regular equilibrium and presents two simple conditions that will allow us to verify if an equilibrium of a potential game is regular. Section 4 proves Theorem 1.
Proof
Strategy. An equilibrium in a potential game can be shown to be regular if and only if the derivatives of the potential function satisfy two simple nondegeneracy conditions (see Section 3 and Lemma 12). The first condition deals with the gradient of the potential function-we refer to it as the first-order non-degeneracy condition. The second condition deals with the Hessian of the potential function-we refer to it as the second-order non-degeneracy condition. We say a potential game is first-order (second-order) non-degenerate if all equilibria in the game satisfy the first-order (second-order) non-degeneracy condition.
We will prove Theorem 1 by showing that almost all potential games are both first and second-order non-degenerate. We proceed in two steps. First, we will prove that almost all potential games are second-order non-degenerate (Proposition 17). We follow roughly the approach of [5, 13] , setting up an appropriate mapping into the space of N -player potential games of a fixed size, and proving that all second-order degenerate games are contained in the set of critical values of the map. The result then follows from Sard's Theorem [14] . We note, however, that the mapping used by Harsanyi [13] for general games fails to give any useful information when restricted to potential games (see Remark 22) . Consequently, our construction differs substantially from Harsanyi's in terms of the mapping used and some of the fundamental technical tools used. Must significantly, we require a strong characterization of the rank of the linear mapping that relates equilibrium points of a game and the game utility structure (see (31) and Proposition 18) . This characterization relies on (relatively) recent results on the signsolvability of matrices [15] , not available to Harsanyi. The case of potential games also differs from the general case in that it is not possible to construct a single mapping a la Harsanyi [13] whose critical values set contains all degenerate games. We are required to decompose the strategy space into a countable family of subsets and construct an appropriate mapping into the space of potential games from each subset.
As our second step in proving Theorem 1, we show that almost all potential games are first-order non-degenerate (Proposition 23). In order to show this, we use our aforementioned characterization of the rank of the linear mapping (see (31) and discussion above) to construct a Lipschitz mapping from a set with low Hausdorff dimension into the space of potential games, such that the range of the map contains all first-order degenerate games. The result then follows from the fact that the graph of a Lipschitz mapping cannot have a higher Hausdorff dimension than its domain ( [7] , Section 2.4.2).
Preliminaries.
2.1. Notation. We begin by defining the notion of a game that will be studied throughout the paper.
Definition 3. A game (in normal form) is given by a tuple
where N ∈ {2, 3, . . .} denotes the number of players, Y i := {y 1 i , . . . , y Ki i } denotes the set of pure strategies (or actions) available to player i, with cardinality K i := |Y i |, and u i : N j=1 Y j → R denotes the utility function of player i. Given some game Γ, let Y := N i=1 Y i denote the set of joint pure strategies available to players, and let K := N i=1 K i denote the number of joint pure strategies. For a finite set S, let (S) denote the set of probability distributions over S. For i = 1, . . . , N , let ∆ i := (Y i ) denote the set of mixed-strategies available to player i. Let ∆ := N i=1 ∆ i denote the set of joint mixed strategies. Note that it is implicitly assumed that players' mixed strategies are independent; i.e., players do not coordinate. Let ∆ −i := j∈{1,...,N }\{i} ∆ j . When convenient, given a mixed strategy σ = (σ 1 , . . . , σ N ) ∈ ∆, we use the notation σ −i to denote the tuple (σ j ) j =i Given a mixed strategy σ ∈ ∆, the expected utility of player i is given by
For σ −i ∈ ∆ −i , the best response of player i is given by the set-valued function
and for σ ∈ ∆ the joint best response is given by the set valued function BR :
A strategy σ ∈ ∆ is said to be a Nash equilibrium (NE) if σ ∈ BR i (σ). For convenience, we sometimes refer to a Nash equilibrium simply as an equilibrium.
We say that Γ is a potential game [21] if there exists a function u :
for all i = 1, . . . , N . We note that the potential function associated with a given potential game is unique up to an additive constant [21] .
Let U : ∆ → R be the multilinear extension of u defined by
The function U may be seen as giving the expected value of u under the mixed strategy σ. We refer to U as the potential function and to u as the pure form of the potential function.
Using the definitions of U i and U it is straightforward to verify that
Thus, in order to compute the best response set we only require knowledge of the potential function U , not necessarily the individual utility functions (U i ) i=1,...,N . By way of notation, given a pure strategy y i ∈ Y i and a mixed strategy σ −i ∈ ∆ −i , we will write U (y i , σ −i ) to indicate the value of U when player i uses a mixed strategy placing all weight on the y i and the remaining players use the strategy σ −i ∈ ∆ −i .
Given a σ i ∈ ∆ i , let σ k i denote value of the k-th entry in σ i , so that σ i = (σ k i ) Ki k=1 . Since the potential function is linear in each σ i , if we fix any i = 1, . . . , N we may express it as
In order to study learning dynamics without being (directly) encumbered by the hyperplane constraint inherent in ∆ i we define
where we use the convention that x k i denotes the k-th entry in x i so that
. Let X := X 1 × · · · × X N and let T : X → ∆ be the bijection given by T = T 1 × · · · × T N . In an abuse of terminology, we sometimes refer to X as the mixedstrategy space of Γ. When convenient, given an x ∈ X we use the notation x −i to denote the tuple (x j ) j =i . Letting X −i := j =i X j , we define T −i :
Throughout the paper we often find it convenient to work in X rather than ∆. In order to keep the notation as simple as possible we overload the definitions of some symbols when the meaning can be clearly derived from the context. In particular, let BR i :
Similarly, given an x ∈ X we abuse notation and write U (x) instead of U (T (x)).
Given a pure strategy y i ∈ Y i , we will write U (y i , x −i ) to indicate the value of U when player i uses a mixed strategy placing all weight on the y i and the remaining players use the strategy x −i ∈ X −i . Similarly, we will say y k i ∈ BR i (x −i ) if there exists an x i ∈ BR i (x −i ) such that T i (x i ) places weight one on y k i . Applying the definition of T i to (2) we see that U (x) may also be expressed as
for any i = 1, . . . , N . We use the following nomenclature to refer to strategies in X.
Definition 4. (i) A strategy x ∈ X is said to be pure if T (x) places all its mass on a single action tuple y ∈ Y . (ii) A strategy x ∈ X is said to be completely mixed if x is in the interior of X.
(iii) In all other cases, a strategy x ∈ X is said to be incompletely mixed.
Other notation as used throughout the paper is as follows.
• N := {1, 2, . . .}.
• The mapping sgn : R n×m → R n×m is given by
• Given two matrices A and B of the same dimension, A • B denotes the Hadamard product (i.e., the entrywise product) of A and B.
..,p . Then the operator D w gives the Jacobian of F with respect to the components of w = (w k ) k=1,...,m ; that is
• A c denotes the complement of a set A, andÅ denotes the interior of A, and cl A denotes the closure of A. 3. Regular Equilibria. The notion of a regular equilibrium was originally introduced by Harsanyi [13] . Subsequently, these equilibria were studied by Van Damme [32, 33] , who introduced a slightly modified definition of a regular equilibrium that is generally standard today. Informally, an equilibrium is said to be regular if the Jacobian of a certain differentiable mapping is non-singular. We will see that in potential games, the notion of a regularity takes on a more intuitive meaning. Roughly speaking, an equilibrium x * of a potential game is regular if x * is a non-degenerate critical point of the potential function (i.e., the Hessian of the potential function is non-singular at x * ). 5 We will now formally define the notion of a regular equilibrium as given in [32, 33] . We begin by defining the carrier set of an element x ∈ X, a natural modification of a support set to the present context. For
i.e., carr i (x i ) is the set of pure strategies in Y i that receive positive weight under the (conventional) mixed strategy
For each pure strategy y τ ∈ Y , τ = 1, . . . , K let u τ denote the pure-strategy potential associated with playing y τ ; that is, u τ := u(y τ ), where u is the pure form of the potential function defined in Section 2. A vector of potential coefficients u = (u τ ) K τ =1 is an element of R K that uniquely defines the multi-linear potential function U .
Given a strategy x ∈ X and vector of potential coefficients u ∈ R K , let
for i = 1, . . . , N , k = 1, . . . , K i − 1, and let
5 If x * is an interior equilibrium point, then this holds exactly, and the invertiblity of the Hessian alone is sufficient to determine the regularity of x * . If x * touches a boundary of X, then the notion of regularity is slightly more delicate and requires us to also look at the gradient of U at x * .
Definition 5 (Regular Equilibrium). Let x * ∈ X be an equilibrium of a game with potential coefficient vector u. Assume the action set Y i of each player is reordered so that y 1 i ∈ carr i (x * i ). The equilibrium x * is said to be regular if the Jacobian of F (x * , u), given by D xF (x * , u), is non-singular. Remark 6. We note that if x * is regular, then the Jacobian ofF (x * , u) can be shown to be nonsingular under any reordering of Y i in which the reference action satisfies y 1 i ∈ carr i (x * i ) for all i = 1, . . . , N (see [32] , Theorem 3.8). This justifies the use of an arbitrary reference action y 1 i ∈ carr i (x * i ) in the above definition. Remark 7. The notion of a regular equilibrium is traditionally defined by considering strategies in the space ∆ rather than X [33] . Using the definition ofF k i and the properties of the determinant of a matrix, it is straightforward to confirm that the definition of regularity given in Definition 5 coincides with the traditional definition in [33] . See the extended version of this paper [31] for more details.
We note that the notion of a regular equilibrium is traditionally defined by considering strategies in the space ∆ rather than X. In particular, in an abuse of notation, given a strategy σ ∈ ∆ and a vector u ∈ R K , let
. . , N , and let
An equilibrium σ * ∈ ∆ is traditionally said to be regular if the strategy set Y i of each player i = 1, . . . , N is ordered so that y 1 i ∈ spt(σ i ) and the Jacobian D σF (σ * , u) is non-singular [33] .
To see that the definition of a regular equilibrium given in Definition 5 coincides with the traditional definition given in [33] , suppose that x * ∈ X is an equilibrium of some potential game with potential coefficient vector u, and let σ * = T (x * ). The Jacobian D xF (x * , u) may be formed from D σF (σ * , u) by removing the rows of D σF (σ * , u) corresponding to the coordinate mapsF 0 i , i = 1, . . . , N and removing the columns of D σF (σ * , u) in which the partial derivative is taken with respect to σ 1 i , i = 1, . . . , N . Using (6)-(8), (4) may be equivalently expressed in terms of strategies σ ∈ ∆ as
Note that for i = 1, . . . , N , and k = 1, . . . , K i − 1, we have
This follows from (9) and the fact that for k = 1, . . . , K i − 1, either
or σ k+1 i = 0. Note also that by (7) we have
. . , N , j = i. This means that for each i = 1, . . . , N , the column of D σF (σ * , u) in which the partial derivative is taken with respect to σ 1 i is composed of all zeros except for a one in the row corresponding toF 0 i . Thus, by the definition of the determinant, removing the above mentioned rows and columns from D σF (σ * , u) does not change the value of the determinant of the resulting matrix. Consequently, D xF (x * , u) is invertible if and only if D σF (σ * , u) is invertible, and the equilibrium x * ∈ X is regular as defined in Definition 5 if and only if σ * is regular as defined in [13] .
3.1. Regular Equilibria in Potential Games. In potential games, the notion of a regular equilibrium has a natural and intuitive interpretation in terms of the derivatives of the potential function. In this section we discuss a pair of conditions applicable within potential games that are equivalent to regularity. The first condition (referred to as the first-order condition) concerns the gradient of the potential function; the second condition (referred to as the second-order condition) concerns the Hessian of the potential function.
In Sections 3.1.1-3.1.2 we formally define the notions of first and second-order degeneracy. In Section 3.1.3 we show that, in a potential game, an equilibrium satisfies these non-degeneracy conditions if and only if it is regular.
. . , N be some carrier set. Let γ i := |C i | and assume that the strategy set Y i is reordered so that {y 1 i , . . . , y γi i } = C i . Under this ordering, the first γ i − 1 components of any strategy x i with carr i (x i ) = C i are free (not constrained to zero by C i ) and the remaining components of x i are constrained to zero. That is (x k i ) γi−1 k=1 is free under C i and (x k i ) Ki k=γi = 0. The set of strategies {x ∈ X : carr(x) = C} is precisely the interior of the face of X given by (10) Ω
Definition 8 (First-Order Degenerate Equilibrium). Let x * ∈ X be an equilibrium with carrier C. We say that x * is first-order degenerate if there exists a pair (i, k), i = 1, . . . , N , k = γ i , . . . , K i − 1 such that ∂U (x * ) ∂x k i = 0, and we say x * is first-order non-degenerate otherwise.
Example. The 2 × 2 identical interests game with payoff matrix M = 0 0 1 −1 has a first-order degenerate equilibrium at the strategy in which the row player plays his second action with probability 1 and the column player mixes between both his actions with equal probability.
Remark 9. Using the multi-linearity of U , it is straightforward to verify that an equilibrium x * with carrier C is first order non-degenerate if and only if, for every player i, the set of pure-strategy best responses to x * −i coincides with C i . We note that, using this later definition, Harsanyi [13] referred to first-order non-degenerate equilibria as quasi-strong equilibria. We prefer to use the term first-order non-degenerate in order to emphasize that we are concerned with the gradient of the potential function and to keep the nomenclature consistent with the notion of second-order nondegeneracy, introduced next.
Second-Order
Degeneracy. Let C be some carrier set. LetÑ := |{i = 1, . . . , N : γ i ≥ 2}|, and assume that the player set is ordered so that γ i ≥ 2 for i = 1, . . . ,Ñ . Under this ordering, for strategies with carr(x) = C, the firstÑ players use mixed strategies and the remaining players use pure strategies. Assume that N ≥ 1 so that any x with carrier C is a mixed (not pure) strategy.
Let the Hessian of U taken with respect to C be given by
Note that this definition of the Hessian restricts attention to the components of x that are free (i.e., unconstrained) under C. That is,H(x) taken with respect to C is the Hessian of U | Ω C at x.
Definition 10 (Second-Order Degenerate Equilibrium). We say an equilibrium x * ∈ X is second-order degenerate if the HessianH(x * ) taken with respect to carr(x * ) is singular, and we say x * is second-order non-degenerate otherwise.
Remark 11. Note that both forms of degeneracy are concerned with the interaction of the potential function and the "face" of the strategy space containing the equilibrium x * . If x * touches one or more constraints, then first-order non-degeneracy ensures that the gradient of the potential function is nonzero normal to the face Ω carr(x * ) , defined in (10) . Second-order non-degeneracy ensures that, restricting U to the face Ω carr(x * ) , the Hessian of U Ω carr(x * )
is non-singular. If x * is contained within the interior of X, then the first-order condition becomes moot and the second-order condition reduces to the standard definition of a non-degenerate critical point.
Regular Equilibria and Potential Function
Degeneracy. The following lemma allows us to study the regularity of an equilibrium via the first and second-order degeneracy conditions. Lemma 12. Let Γ be a potential game. Then, (i) If an equilibrium x * is first-order non-degenerate, then it is second-order nondegenerate if and only if it is regular. (ii) If an equilibrium x * is regular, then it is first-order non-degenerate.
In particular, an equilibrium x * is regular if and only if it is both first and secondorder non-degenerate.
The proof of this lemma follows readily from the definitions and can be found in the extended version of this paper [31] .
The following definitions will be useful in the proof of the lemma. Given a carrier set C = C 1 ∪ · · · ∪ C N , let
In particular, note that for i = 1, . . . , N , k = 1, . . . , γ i − 1 we have the relationship
whereF k i is as defined in (4).
Proof. In order to simplify notation and minimize the overuse of superscripts, throughout the proof we will use the symbolx rather than the usual x * , when referring to an equilibrium. Without loss of generality, given an equilibriumx ∈ X, assume that each player's action set Y i is reordered so that carr i (x i ) = {y 1 i , . . . , y γi i }. Note that this comports with the ordering assumption implicit in the definitions of both first and second-order degeneracy (see Sections 3.1.1-3.1.2).
We begin by proving (ii). As noted in Remark 9, an equilibrium is first-order non-degenerate if and only if it is quasi-strong, as introduced by Harsanyi [13] . It was shown in [33] that any regular equilibrium is quasi-strong. Hence, (ii) holds.
We now prove (i). Assume henceforth thatx is a first-order non-degenerate equilibrium.
Our goal is to show that
Given an x ∈ X, it is useful to consider the decomposition x = (x p , x m ), where
..,Ñ , k=1,...,γi−1 and x p contains the remaining components of x. (The subscript of x m is indicative of "mixed strategy components" of x and x p indicative of "pure strategy components" of x.) Noting that
where F is defined as in (13) with respect to the carrier carr(x), we see that (15) is equivalent to showing
With this end in mind, we will now consider the behavior of the component maps of F and F in two important cases. Case 1: Suppose (i, k) is such that k ∈ {1, . . . , γ i − 1}. Note that in this case we havex k i > 0. Differentiating (14) with respect to x j , (j, ) = (i, k) we get
Since k ∈ {1, . . . , γ i − 1}, we have F k i (x, u) = 0 and hence,
Differentiating (14) with respect to x k i we get
By our choice of (i, k) we have F k i (x, u) = 0. Also note that F k i (x, u) does not depend on x k i (see (12) ), and hence ∂F k i (x,u) ∂x k i = 0. By (18) , this implies that
But we just showed that
Together, (17) and (19) imply that for each (i, k) such that k = 1, . . . ,
Note that in this case we havex k i = 0. Differentiating (4) with respect to x j , (j, ) = (i, k) we get
where the equality to zero holds sincex k i = 0. Note in particular that this implies that D xmF k i (x, u) = 0. If we differentiate (4) with respect to x k i and use the fact thatx k i = 0 we get
Sincex is a first-order non-degenerate equilibrium,
This, along with (21) , implies that
is a diagonal matrix with non-zero diagonal. We now consider the Jacobian D xF (x, u). This may be expressed as
By the above arguments we see that this matrix has the form
is an invertible diagonal matrix. Given this block form we see that D xF (x, m) is invertible if and only if
..,N k=1,...,γi−1 is invertible. By (20) we then see that D xF (x, u) is invertible if and only if D xm F (x, u) is invertible, which proves the desired result.
Regularity in Almost
All Potential Games. In Definitions 8 and 10 and Lemma 12 above, we see that the degeneracy (or regularity) of an equilibrium of a potential game is uniquely determined by the potential function. Consequently, we find it convenient to use the following nomenclature, which deals directly with the potential function rather than a particular potential game.
Definition 13. (i) We say that x * ∈ X is a first-order (second-order) degenerate equilibrium of a potential function U if x * is a first-order (second-order) degenerate equilibrium for any (and consequently, for every) potential game having potential function U .
(ii) We say that x * ∈ X is a degenerate equilibrium of a potential function U if x * is a first or second-order degenerate equilibrium of U . (iii) We say that a potential function U is first-order (second-order) degenerate if it possesses any first-order (second-order) degenerate equilibria x * ∈ X.
(iv) We say that a potential function U is degenerate if it is first or second-order degenerate.
Assuming players action spaces satisfy |Y i | = K i for i = 1, . . . , N , and K = N i=1 K i , a potential function U is uniquely determined by a vector in R K designating the potential assigned to each action tuple y ∈ Y . Viewing each potential function as such a vector, the space of potential functions is given by R K .
Lemma 12 implies that a potential game is regular if and only if the associated potential function is non-degenerate. In light of this, we define the notion of regularity in almost all potential games as follows.
Definition 14. We say that almost all potential games are regular if almost all potential functions are both first and second-order non-degenerate. More precisely, we say that almost all potential games are regular if for for arbitrary K i ∈ {2, 3, . . .}, |Y i | = K i , i = 1, . . . , N , K = N i=1 K i , the set of associated potential functions that are first and/or second-order degenerate is a closed set with L K -measure zero.
Remark 15. We note that the notion of "almost all potential games" given above can be equivalently stated directly in terms of the set of potential games rather than the set of potential functions. By stacking players utility functions into a single vector, a game may be seen as a point in R N K . One may show that the set of potential games is linear subspace of R N K with dimension K p := ( N i=1 j =i K j ) + N + K − 1. Let P ⊂ R KN denote the set of all potential games. When we say almost all potential games are regular, as in Definition 14, this may be equivalently stated that the set of irregular potential games is a closed subset of P with L Kp -measure zero. However, to simplify the exposition, we find it convenient to work directly with Definition 14.
Remark 16. It was shown by Harsanyi that the set of irregular N -player games is a closed subset in the space of N -player games [13, 33] . Since the set of potential games is a subspace of the space of N -player games, it immediately follows that the set of irregular potential games is a closed set with respect to the space of potential games. Hence, in order to prove that almost all potential games are regular we only need prove that the set of potential functions that are first and/or second-order degenerate has L K -measure zero. 
Second-Order Degenerate
Games. The goal of this subsection is to prove the following proposition.
Proposition 17. The set of potential functions which are second-order degenerate has L K -measure zero.
We will prove the proposition using Sard's theorem. Our construction roughly follows that of [13] . We begin by introducing some pertinent notation and preliminary results.
Note that the set of joint pure strategies Y may be expressed as an ordered set Y = {y 1 , . . . , y K } where each y τ ∈ Y , is an N -tuple of strategies, τ ∈ {1, . . . , K}. We will assume a particular ordering for this set after Proposition 18.
If we consider the vector of potential function coefficients u ∈ R K as a variable, then by (1), U is linear in u. 6 At this point we will express U in a more convenient form.
Let τ = 1, . . . , K, i = 1, . . . , N and x i ∈ X i . We define q τ i :
where k corresponds to the action played by player i in the tuple y τ , i.e, (y τ ) i = y k i , and where T k i (x i ) is the k-th component of T i (x i ). In an abuse of notation, given a pure strategy y k i ∈ Y i , we let q τ i (y k i ) = 1 if (y τ ) i = y k i and q τ i (y k i ) = 0 otherwise. Given a fixed vector of potential coefficients u ∈ R K , the potential function U : X → R may be expressed as (see (1) and (22))
Note that this form makes it clear that U is linear in u. Now, let C = C 1 ∪ · · · ∪ C N be some carrier set. The analysis through the remainder of the section will rely on this carrier set being fixed, and many of the subsequent terms are implicitly dependent on the choice of C. In keeping with our prior convention we let γ i := |C i |, and letÑ := |{i ∈ {1, . . . , N } : γ i ≥ 2}|. Any x i with carrier C i has precisely γ i − 1 free components (i.e., not constrained to zero by C i ). The joint strategy x = (x 1 , . . . , x N ) is a vector with
By (3) we have that
Given an x ∈ X, it is at times useful to decompose it as x = (x p , x m ), where x m = (x k i ) i=1,...,Ñ , k=1,...,γi−1 and x p contains the remaining components of x. (The subscript of x m is indicative of "mixed strategy components" of x and x p indicative of "pure strategy components" of x.) In this decomposition, x m is a γ-dimensional vector containing the free components of x. Taking the Jacobian of F in terms of the components of x m we find that
Let x * be a mixed equilibrium with carrier C. Differentiating (3) we see that at the equilibrium x * we have ∂U (x * ) ∂x k i = 0 for i = 1, . . . ,Ñ , k = 1, . . . , γ i − 1 (see Lemma 25 in appendix), or equivalently,
for i = 1, . . . ,Ñ , k = 1, . . . , γ i − 1. Using (23) in the above we get
It will be convenient to be able to relate the ordering of Y with the ordering of Given an x ∈ X, let A(x) = (a s,τ (x)) s=1,...,γ, τ =1,...,K ∈ R γ×K be defined as the matrix with entries
Using this notation, (28) is equivalently expressed as (31) A(x * )u = 0.
The following proposition establishes the solvability of (31) . We note that, in order to prove Proposition 17 (the main result of this section), it is sufficient to consider only x such that carr(x) = C in the following proposition. However, later, when studying first order degenerate games in Section 4.2, we will consider the notion of an "extended carrier set" (see (42)), and we will need to characterize the rank of A(x) for x with carr(x) ⊂ C.
For any x such that carr(x) ⊆ C, the matrix A(x) has full row rank.
Before proving this proposition we introduce some notation that will permit us to study the structure of A(x).
We begin by establishing a particular ordering of elements in Y . Let
For τ = 1, . . . ,K, let α τ = (α 1 τ , . . . , αÑ τ ) be a multi-index associated with the τ -th action tuple in Y , meaning that
where y 1 i , for i =Ñ + 1, . . . , N , is, by construction, the pure strategy used by player i at any strategy x with carrier C. Let Y be reordered so that for every τ = 1, . . . ,K, i = 1, . . . ,Ñ we have 1 ≤ α i τ ≤ γ i . This ensures that the firstK strategies in Y contain all strategy combinations of the elements of C 1 , . . . , C N , and that for any multi-index α = (α 1 , . . . , αÑ ), 1 ≤ α i ≤ γ i , there exists a unique 1 ≤ τ ≤K such that y τ = (y α 1 1 , . . . , y αÑ N , y 1 N +1 , . . . , y 1 N ). By definition (22) and the ordering we assumed for Y we have that where i = i * (s) and k = k * (s) (see (29) ), and note that a s,τ (x) = r s,τ p s,τ (x) (see (30) ). We may write A(x) = R • P(x), where • is the Hadamard product, and R and P(x) have entries r s,τ and p s,τ (x) respectively. Partition A(x), R and P(x) as A(x) = [A 1 (x) A 2 (x)], R = [R 1 R 2 ], and P(x) = [P 1 (x) P 2 (x)], where A 1 (x), R 1 , P 1 (x) ∈ R γ×K and A 2 (x), R 2 , P 2 (x) ∈ R γ×(K−K) , so we may write
In order to show that A(x) has full row rank, it is sufficient to prove that A 1 (x) has full row rank-this is the approach we will take in proving the proposition.
We address this by studying the sign pattern of A 1 (x). Properties of sign pattern matrices (i.e., matrices with entries in {−1, 0, 1}) have been well-studied [3, 15] . We recall the following definition from [3] , Definition 19. A sign pattern matrix L ∈ R m×n with n ≥ m is said to be an L-matrix if for every matrix M with sgn(M) = sgn(L), the matrix M has full row rank.
The following lemma characterizes L-matrices [3, 15] .
Lemma 20. Let L ∈ R m×n be a sign pattern matrix with n ≥ m. Then L is an L-matrix if and only if for every diagonal sign pattern matrix D ∈ R m×m , D = 0 there is a nonzero column of DL in which each nonzero entry has the same sign.
In light of Definition 19, Proposition 18 is equivalent to the following lemma.
For any x such that carr(x) ⊆ C, the matrix A 1 (x) = (R 1 • sgn(P 1 (x))) is an L-matrix.
The proof of this lemma relies on showing that (R 1 • sgn(P 1 (x))) satisfies the Lmatrix characterization given in Lemma 20. Before proving this lemma we introduce some definitions that will be useful in the proof.
Given a diagonal matrix D ∈ R × , ∈ N, let diag(D) be the vector in R containing the diagonal elements of D.
Given a diagonal sign pattern matrix D ∈ R × , ∈ N, define idx(D) as follows. If diag(D) does not contain any ones, then let idx(D) = 1. Otherwise, let idx(D) be one more than the first index in diag(D) containing a 1. 7, 8 Given a diagonal matrix D ∈ R γ×γ , let D i ∈ R (γi−1)×(γi−1) , i = 1, . . . ,Ñ be the (unique) diagonal matrices satisfying diag(D) = (diag(D 1 ), . . . , diag(D N )).
Proof. Let x be a strategy satisfying carr(x) ⊆ C. In order to show that (R 1 • sgn(P 1 (x))) is an L-matrix, it is sufficient (by Lemma 20) to show that and for any diagonal sign pattern matrix D = 0, there exists a column of D(R 1 • sgn(P 1 (x))) which is nonzero and in which every nonzero entry has the same sign. With this in mind, we begin by giving a characterization of the columns of R 1 .
Suppose that i = 1, . . . ,Ñ and k = 1, . . . , γ i − 1 are fixed. Note the following:
Since α τ is used to define the ordering of actions in Y , we have q τ i (y k+1 i ) = 1 and q τ i (y 1 i ) = 0 (see (32) and preceding discussion). Hence For 1 ≤ τ ≤K, let r τ ∈ R γ be the τ -th column of R 1 . Partition this column as
where r i τ ∈ R γi−1 . From (33) we see that
7 Assume indexing starts with one, not zero. For example, if the first time a 1 appears in diag(D) is at index 2, then idx(D) = 3. 8 The awkward offset in this definition is needed in order to handle the indexing offset inherent in the mapping T i : X i → ∆ i , i = 1, . . . , N .
Given the observations (i)-(iii) above we see that for each i we have (34) r
where the symbol e α i τ −1 refers to the (α i τ − 1)-th canonical vector in R γi−1 and 1 ∈ R γi−1 is the vector of all ones.
We now characterize the columns of sgn(P 1 (x)). For i = 1, . . . ,Ñ we define
Since carr(x) = C, the ordering we assumed for Y i implies that T k i (x) = 0 for k ≥ γ i +1. By the definition of T i , it is not possible to have T k i (x i ) = 0 for all k = 1, . . . , K i and hence I i (x) = ∅.
Let p τ be the τ -th column of P 1 (x) and let p τ := sgn(p τ ) be the τ -th column of sgn(P 1 (x)). 9 Suppose that τ ∈ {1, . . . ,K} is such that for the multi-index α τ we have α i τ ∈ I i (x) for all i = 1, . . . ,Ñ . Then for each s = 1, . . . , γ the (s, τ )-th entry of P 1 (x) is strictly positive (see (22) and (33)), and hence p τ is positive andp τ = 1.
Partition the columns p τ andp τ as
where p i τ ,p i τ ∈ R γi−1 . Suppose that τ is such that for the multi-index α τ we have α i τ / ∈ I i (x) for exactly one subindex i ∈ {1, . . . ,Ñ }. Then p i τ is positive (see (33) ) and p j τ is zero for any j = i. Hence,p i τ = 1 andp j τ = 0 for any j = i. Now, let D ∈ R γ×γ be an non-zero diagonal sign pattern matrix. We will show that there is a nonzero column of D(R 1 • sgn(P 1 (x))) in which each nonzero entry is a 1.
We now consider two possible cases for the structure of D and show that in each case there is a nonzero column of D(R 1 • sgn(P 1 (x))) in which every nonzero entry is 1.
Note that α i τ ∈ I i (x) for all i = 1, . . . ,Ñ , and hencep τ = 1 (see discussion preceding (35) ). The τ -th column of D(R 1 • sgn(P 1 (x))) is given by
For any i such that idx(D i ) / ∈ I i (x) we have, by assumption, diag(D i ) = 0 and hence diag(D i ) • r i τ = 0. Moreover, note that in this case we have idx(D i ) = 1 since, by the definition of idx(·), diag(D i ) = 0 implies idx(D i ) = 1.
Suppose now that i is such that idx(D i ) ∈ I i (x). For i = 1, . . . ,Ñ , if α i τ = 1 then r i τ = −1 (by (34) ) and diag(D i ) contains no ones (this is the definition of idx(D i ) = 1). In fact, diag(D i ) contains only entries with value of 0 or −1. Hence, by (34) ). Recalling the definition of idx(·), by our choice of
In particular, this implies that if α i τ = 1 then diag(D i ) • r i τ is not identically zero and every nonzero entry of diag(D i ) • r i τ is 1. In summary, for i = 1, . . . ,Ñ , we have diag(D i ) • r i τ ≥ 0, with equality only when idx(D i ) = 1 and D i = 0. Hence, by (36) , the τ -th column of D(R 1 • sgn(P 1 (x))) satisfies D(r τ •p τ ) ≥ 0, with equality only when idx(D i ) = 1 and D i = 0 for all i. But, by assumption D = 0, so D(r τ •p τ ) = 0.
Case 2: Suppose that for some i ∈ {1, . . . ,Ñ } we have idx(D i ) ∈ I i (x) and diag(D i ) = 0. Let τ ∈ {1, . . . ,K} be chosen such that α i τ = idx(D i ) for exactly one such i ∈ {1, . . . ,Ñ } and for all other j = i we have α i τ ∈ I j (this is always possible since I j = ∅). Then we havẽ p i τ = 1, andp j τ = 0, for all j = i (see discussion following (35)). As shown in Case 1, if α i τ = 1, then D i ≤ 0 and r i τ = −1 which implies that diag(D i ) • r i τ ≥ 0. Moreover, sincep i τ = 1 and since, by assumption diag(D i ) = 0 we have diag(D i ) • r i τ •p i τ = 0 and every nonzero entry is 1. If 2 ≤ α i τ ≤ γ i , then, again using the same reasoning as in Case 1, we see that diag(D i ) • r i τ = e α i τ −1 . Sincep i τ = 1 we get that diag(D i ) • r i τ • p i τ = e α i τ −1 . For j = i we havep j τ = 0, which implies diag(D j ) • r j τ •p j τ = 0. All together, this implies that the τ -th column of D(R 1 • sgn(P 1 (x))), given by (diag(D j ) • r j τ •p j τ )Ñ j=1 , is nonzero and every nonzero entry is equal to 1. Since this holds for arbitrary diagonal sign matrix D = 0, Lemma 20 implies that (R 1 • sgn(P 1 (x))) is an L-matrix. Since this holds for any x satisfying carr(x) ⊆ C, we see that the desired result holds.
Given the carrier C there are K γ possible combinations (of length γ) of the columns of A(x). For each r = 1, . . . , K γ , let A r (x) ∈ R γ×γ denote a square matrix formed by taking one unique combination of the columns of A(x). For r = 1, . . . , K γ , let S r := {x ∈ X : carr(x) = C, det A r (x) = 0}.
By Proposition 18, no strategy x ∈ X with carr(x) = C may simultaneously be in all S c r . Note also that each S r is open relative to the set {x ∈ X : carr(x) = C} =Ω C (see (10) ). Thus, we may construct a countable family of open balls (B ) ≥1 , B ⊂ Ω C that satisfy: (i) ≥1 B = {x ∈ X : carr(x) = C} (ii) For each ∈ N there exists an r ∈ {1, . . . , K γ } such that B ⊆ S r (i.e., A r (x) is invertible for all x ∈ B ).
Fix ∈ {1, 2, . . .}. After reordering, A(x) may be partitioned as A(x) = [Ã r (x) A r (x)], whereÃ r (x) is a matrix formed by the columns of A(x) not used to form A r (x). Let the strategy set Y be reordered in the same way as the columns A(x). 10 Given a vector of potential coefficients u ∈ R K , let it be partitioned as u = (u 1 , u 2 ), where u 1 = (u 1 , . . . , u K−γ ) and u 2 = (u K−γ+1 , . . . , u K ). Defineρ :
If x * ∈ B is an equilibrium for some potential game with potential coefficient vector u, then by (31) we have A(x * )u = 0. Since A r (x * ) is invertible, this is equivalent to
is an equilibrium of some potential game with potential coefficient vector u = (u 1 , u 2 ), the functionρ permits us to recover u 2 given u 1 and x * .
Conversely, suppose x ∈ B and u 1 ∈ R K−γ are arbitrary. If u = (u 1 , u 2 ) with u 2 =ρ (x, u 1 ), then by the definition ofρ we see that A(x)u = 0. By the definition of A(x) (see (25)-(30)) this implies
for all x ∈ B .
Thus, taking a partial derivative with respect to x k i we get
Consider again the decomposition x = (x p , x m ). Using compact notation, (38) is restated as
Suppose x * ∈ B is an equilibrium of a potential game with potential coefficients u and carr(x * ) = C. Applying the chain rule in (39), using (26) , and using the fact that F (x, u) = A(x)u =Ã r (x)u 1 + A r (x)u 2 , we find that at x * there holds 11
whereJ ρ (x, u) := Dx mρ (x p ,x m , u) xm=xm is the Jacobian ofρ taken with respect to x m . Since A r (x) is invertible for all x ∈ B , this means that given any equilibrium x * ∈ B , the HessianH(x * ) is nonsingular if and only if the JacobianJ ρ (x * , u) is nonsingular.
For each ∈ N, define the function ρ : ρ (x, u 1 ) ). The function ρ is a trivial extension ofρ that recovers the full vector of potential coefficients u ∈ R K given u 1 ∈ R K−γ and an equilibrium x * ∈ B .
Remark 22. In the case of general N -player games, as considered in [13, 33] , Harsanyi (and Van Damme) construct a mapping into R N K (denoted by the symbol ρ * * in [13] ) which recovers the individual utility coefficients for each player, given a subset of the utility coefficients and an equilibrium strategy. In that case, the equality governing the relationship between strategies and utility coefficients is given by an equation analogous to (31) (see (49) in [13] ) in which the matrix corresponding to A(x) in (31) has dimension γ × N K. Effectively, Harsanyi's mapping ρ * * is constructed by choosing γ columns of the associated matrix A(x) that are linearly independent for all x ∈ X, and inverting this square submatrix as in (37) . In the case of potential games, it is not possible to choose γ columns of A(x) that are linearly independent for all x ∈ X. (In particular, Harsanyi's mapping ρ * * looses uniqueness when applied to potential games). Instead, one must construct a collection of (well-defined) mappings (ρ ) , each of which recovers the full vector of potential coefficients given a subset of potential coefficients and an equilibrium strategy x * in some appropriate subset of X.
Note that the Jacobian of ρ takes the form
for some matrix M. Clearly, det J ρ = 0 if and only if detJ ρ = 0. Thus, by (40) we see that if x * ∈ B is an equilibrium of a game with potential coefficient vector u, then
We now prove Proposition 17.
Proof. Let C be a carrier set. Let U(C) ⊆ R K be the set of potential functions having at least one degenerate equilibrium with carrier set C; that is,
For ∈ N, let U(C, ) ⊆ R K be the subset of potential functions having at least one degenerate equilibrium x * ∈ B , where B is defined with respect to C; that is,
By construction, we have ≥1 B = {x ∈ X : carr(x) = C}, and hence U(C) = ≥1 U(C, ). We showed above that for any (x, u) ∈ B × R K such that x is an equilibrium of the potential game with potential coefficients u, the HessianH(x) (taken with respect to C) is invertible if and only if the Jacobian of ρ (x, u) is invertible. Thus, the set U(C, ) is contained in the set of critical values of ρ . By Sard's theorem, we get that U(C, ) is a set with L K -measure zero. Since U(C) is the countable union of sets of L K -measure zero, it is itself a set with L K -measure zero.
Let U ⊂ R K denote the set of potential functions with at least one degenerate equilibrium. The set U may be expressed as the union U = C U(C) taken over all possible support sets C. Since there are a finite number of support sets C, the set U has L K -measure zero.
First-Order Degenerate
Games. The following proposition shows that first-order degenerate games form a null set.
Proposition 23. The set of potential functions which are first-order degenerate has L K -measure zero.
Proof. Fix some set C = C 1 ∪ · · · ∪ C N where each C i is a nonempty subset of Y i . Let C be any strict subset of C. In the context of this proof let γ i := |C i |, let γ := N i=1 (γ i − 1), letÑ := |{i = 1, . . . , N : γ i ≥ 2}|, and assume Y i is reordered so that {y 1 i , . . . , y γi i } = C i . Note that this ordering implies that for any x with carr(x) = C we have y 1 i ∈ carr(x), i = 1, . . . , N . Given an equilibrium x * let the extended carrier of x * be defined as Suppose that x * is an equilibrium with extended carrier C. By Lemma 25 (see appendix) and the ordering we assumed for Y i we have where F k i is as defined in (24) . Thus, if x * is an equilibrium for some game with potential coefficient vector u ∈ R K , and ext carr (x * ) = C, then by the definition of A(x) (see (25)-(30)), (43) implies that A(x * )u = 0, or equivalently,
where the matrix A(x) ∈ R γ×K is defined with respect to C, as in (30) .
Let U(C, C) ⊆ R K be the set of potential functions in which there exists an equilibrium x * with carr(x * ) = C and ext carr (x * ) = C. Let X := {x ∈ X : carr(x) = C}.
By the above we see that (44) U(C, C) ⊆ ∪ x∈ X ker A(x).
For each x ∈ X, let range A(x) T denote the range space of A(x) T . Each entry of A(x) T is a polynomial function in x and hence is Lipschitz continuous over the bounded set X. By Proposition 18 we have rank A(x) T = γ for all x ∈ X. Thus, we may choose a set of γ basis vectors {b 1 (x), . . . , b γ (x)} spanning range A(x) T such that each b k (x) ∈ R K , k = 1, . . . , γ is a Lipschitz continuous function in x. Moreover, we may choose a complementary set of (K −γ) linearly independent vectors {b γ+1 (x), . . . , b K (x)} forming a basis for the orthogonal complement (range A(x) T ) ⊥ , with each b k (x) ∈ R K , k = γ + 1, . . . , K being a continuous function in Since C C, the Hausdorff dimension of X is at most (γ − 1) and the Hausdorff dimension of X × R K−γ is at most K − 1. Since f is Lipschitz continuous, this implies (see [7] , Section 2.4) that the Hausdorff dimension of f ( X × R K−γ ) is at most K − 1, and in particular, that f ( X × R K−γ ) has L K -measure zero. By (44) and (45), this implies that U(C, C) has L K -measure zero.
Let U ⊆ R K denote the set of all potential functions containing a first-order degenerate equilibrium. Since we may represent this set as a finite union of L Kmeasure zero sets,
the set U also has L K measure zero.
Appendix.
Lemma 24. Let x ∈ X and i = 1, . . . , N . Assume Yi is ordered so that y 1 i ∈ BRi(x−i). Then: (i) For k = 1, . . . , Ki − 1 we have ∂U (x) Proof. Since U is multilinear, y k i must be a pure-strategy best response to x * −i . The result then follows from Lemma 24.
